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Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for their unpredictability (2004 
Economic Report of the President) and for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a 
payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes 
unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000), the escalation of liability insurance premiums and 
over-deterrence. In an attempt to overcome some of these negative effects, several US 
states have implemented different kinds of tort reform. Some reforms take the form of 
caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others, called “split-recoveries”, have 
mandated that a share of the award be allocated to the plaintiff with the remainder going 
to the state.  
Our paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation that incorporates agency 
problems between the plaintiff and its attorney and court errors on assessing liability. We 
extend Hylton’s (2002) theoretical framework by explicitly modeling the role of the 
plaintiff’s attorney and by deriving sufficient conditions for a unique universally-divine 
mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Banks and Sobel, 1987). In this empirically 
relevant equilibrium, some defendants choose to be liable; some lawsuits are not 
meritorious (frivolous lawsuits); and, some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out-
of-court and some go to trial. Our model allows for court errors on assessing the liability 
of defendants. Predictability of punitive awards is defined as the probability that a 
defendant will be erroneously found liable of punitive damages by the court. We derive 
analytically the optimal level of punitive awards under caps and split-recoveries. We also 
analyze the effect of predictability on deterrence and litigation outcomes and find a 
predictability threshold beyond which the deterrence effect of punitive awards vanishes. 
We then analyze the effect of split-recoveries and caps on the probability that firms 
choose to be liable, the probability that frivolous lawsuits are filed, and the probability 
that a lawsuit proceeds to the award stage of a trial. Consistent with Babcock and 
Pogarsky’s (1999) findings on caps, and with Landeo, Nikitin and Babcock’s (2004) 
findings on split-recoveries, our model predicts that caps and split-recoveries decrease the 
probability of trial. However, caps and split-recoveries also increase the likelihood that a 
firm chooses to be liable (and therefore, increase the probability of accidents) because 
they lower the expected litigation costs. The firm reacts to these lower expected costs by 
reducing expenditures on safety. Finally, split-recoveries and caps reduce the incentives 
for the frivolous plaintiffs to file a lawsuit. We establish sufficient conditions under 
which the overall welfare effect of these reforms is unambiguously positive, because the 
reduction in frivolous lawsuits and the reduction in litigation costs of meritorious 
plaintiffs and defendants offset the negative effect of increasing the likelihood of 
accidents. 